Sri Lankan journalists and civil society protest against the incident and call for an immediate investigation.

Sources
Defence Reporter Abducted and Severely Beaten In Sri Lanka, International Federation of Journalists, 23 May 2008; Noyahr’s nightmare, Daily Mirror, 24 May 2008; Condemnation from all quarters, Sunday Times, 25 May 2008.

Quotations

“The Free Media Movement expresses shock and outrage that Keith Noyahr, Deputy Editor and Defence Analyst of the English weekly The Nation was abducted late evening yesterday returned home early this morning, after enduring severe physical harm. This is not just a violation of the freedom of expression and another significant blow to media freedom. It proves, as if more proof was needed, that Sri Lanka is very far from a country that protects fundamental rights and is governed by the rule of law,” Free Media Movement, Sri Lanka.

“We believe that the reason for this attack is Noyahr’s independent writing and analysis of the country’s civil war,” Poddala Jayantha, secretary of Sri Lanka Working Journalists’ Association.

“The way he was beaten is unprecedented. If the government can’t [bring the perpetrators to justice] we hold the government responsible for this abduction and attack,” Sunanda Deshapriya of the Free Media Movement.

Extracts from ‘Victory day not far off’, an interview with Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, 23 July 2008
Q: But it is reported that the army is behind the attack on Keith Noyahr of The Nation newspaper who had written a military story criticising the military few weeks before the attack. What do you have to say about this allegation?

A: How many other journalists write political or military columns? Why should the army attack only on Keith Noyahr. I have never seen anywhere that Keith Noyahr had said that the army had attacked him. Some people are trying to put us against him. He has never accused that the army had assaulted him. And I think perhaps he is guilty that he has done something wrong by writing against the military.

Q: Is he tight-lipped because he is supposed to be in fear of reprisals?

A: If he has not done anything wrong, he does not have to live in fear. If he has done some damage to our organisation or to a person, especially when he has done something which he is not suppose to do, then it is natural he must be living in fear. If they think that they have done something of that nature the best thing for them is to correct themselves and rectify the mistake.

Q: What is the role you expect the media to play during the time of war?

A: War or no war, the media should write in the interest of the country and not to please their favourites. The media is supposed to play a neutral role to educate people. They are not supposed to create situations where they groom people and make heroes out of them. I do not think that certain media in this country is doing their duty with a sense of responsibility. Media freedom is there for you to do the right thing and to be fair by everybody. Nobody has given freedom for anybody to drive their own agendas. We know very well about those media people who take bribes, write and voice their opinion for some personal gains. That Keith Noyahr who was assaulted was returning from a restaurant with his friends and they were drunk. We do not know that somebody in the restaurant had got annoyed with them, followed him and assaulted.

Related events
29 April 2005
12 August 2005
24 January 2006
2 July 2006
9 January 2007

External links
An army is not its commander’s private fiefdom, The Nation, 11 May 2008; Sri Lanka’s defence ministry lashes out at war reporting, AFP, 5 June 2008

Sources
If Sri Lanka does not want our help what can we do? Daily Mirror, 29 March 2008; International experts pull out but government backs human rights inquiry, IRIN News, 4 April 2008.

Quotations

“If we stayed on, business would go on as usual. By withdrawing we are creating a situation where Sri Lankan authorities have to clearly take up the responsibility in protecting human rights. Most of the suggestions that were made by the IIGEP have been ignored or rejected. So we no longer see how we can contribute further to the protection and enhancement of human rights in Sri Lanka. … A two pronged response is needed to safeguard the perception of validity and legitimacy of the commission. The first is a national response. It is up to the government to ensure that the CoI is effectively independent. The government must now show that it has a political will which it hasn’t shown up to now to allow the commission to do its job. Secondly, the international community must get involved with the whole issue of human rights protection and the prosecution of violators. … There is a real problem of witness protection in this country which goes far beyond legislation and this is something that we have tried to address in our modest level. The burden of the question lies clearly with the government to address the climate of fear and find ways of ensuring that witnesses are protected. … After a certain time we were just repeating ourselves. I understand the constraints of the government, but we have to say that this is a lack of political will. … Generally successful procedures have been developed after the conflict or with a change of administration. But now you have an ongoing war and an ongoing administration. I do understand the difficulties in such a context. Once again Sri Lanka has to decide what it wants.” Jean-Pierre Cot, Emeritus Professor of the University of Paris and Judge, an eminent person in the IIGEP.

“We didn’t ask the IIGEP to leave. They had their reasons for going to which the COI and the attorney general’s department have put forward their own positions. We still have confidence the COI will produce results. I’m as desperate as anyone else to show results, especially when I have to go before international forums.” Mahinda Samarasinghe, Minister of Human Rights and Disaster Management.

“President Mahinda Rajapaksa, once a rights advocate, has now led his government to become one of the world’s worst perpetrators of forced disappearances. The end of the ceasefire means this crisis will continue until the government starts taking serious measures.” Elaine Pearson, Human Rights Watch Deputy Asia Director.

Extracts from Human Rights Watch report

“In the great majority of cases documented by Human Rights Watch and Sri Lankan groups, evidence indicates the involvement of government security forces – army, navy, or police. …

“Relatives frequently described uniformed policemen, especially members of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), taking their relatives into custody before they “disappeared.” The police claimed that these individuals were needed for questioning, yet did not say where they were being taken and did not produce the required “arrest receipt.” After these arrests, the families did not manage to obtain any information on the detainees’ fate or whereabouts. …

“Most of the victims are ethnic Tamils, although Muslims and Sinhalese have also been targeted. In many cases, the security forces “disappeared” individuals because of their alleged affiliation with the LTTE. Clergy, educators, humanitarian aid workers, and journalists also were targeted – not only to remove them from the civil sphere, but also to warn others to avoid such activities. …

“Vairamuththu Varatharasan, a 40-year-old truck driver and father of five, was abducted from his home in Colombo on January 7, 2007, and has not been seen since. His wife told Human Rights Watch:

“A group of about 20 men – some in police uniforms, some in civilian clothes surrounded the house. One policeman came inside and asked for our identity card. I went into one of the rooms to get the identity card. By the time I came out of the room, my husband was not there; neither was the policeman. I ran out and spotted a van parked in a dark place on the road. I ran to the road, but by the time I got there, the van started and left.”

Related events
6 November 2006
11 June 2007
25 June 2007

Related links
The President’s Commission of Inquiry to Investigate and Inquire into Alleged Serious Violations of Human Rights website; Recurring Nightmare: State Responsibility for “Disappearances” and Abductions in Sri Lanka, Human Rights Watch, 6 March 2008.

far as declining invitations when these conditions are not met. Given the high levels of insecurity, that include killings and abductions, faced by humanitarian agenices, human rights organizations and other civil society organisations we are also deeply concerned of the security implications for the actors who were invited to the meetings”.

Source
Press statement condemning military interference on Jaffna NGOs meetings with UN Under Secretary General on humanitarian affairs, Centre for Poverty Analysis, 9 August 2007;

Extracts from the Press Statement
“Our colleagues in Jaffna have also conveyed to us that on the day before Mr. Holme’s visit to Jaffna, the military commander called for a meeting at Palaly military headquarters, at which NGOs and civil society representatives were instructed not to refer to human rights issues and to restrict themselves to issues of humanitarian assistance during their meeting with Mr. Holmes. The military told the NGO and civil society representatives present that they, the military, would brief Mr. Holmes about the human rights and security situation, while the Government Agent would brief Mr. Holmes about the situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

Humanitarian and human rights groups in Jaffna have expressed their serious reservations about this interference by the military and regret their inability to meet Mr. Holmes in a more private manner, which would have enabled them to freely share their views, perspectives and experiences with him.

We condemn this type of military interference in matters relating to civil society and NGO activity. This completely undermines existing practice in which visiting UN officials meet with civil society groups during country visits, insisting on privacy for such meetings, even going as far as declining invitations when these conditions are not met. Given the high levels of insecurity, that include killings and abductions, faced by humanitarian agencies, human rights organisations and other civil society organisations, we are also deeply concerned about the security implications for the actors who were invited to the meetings.

The steps taken by the military in Jaffna to restrict Mr. Holmes’ access to information can only reaffirm concerns in the international community that there is no transparency and accountability of the government and of the military when it comes to both human rights and humanitarian issues in the conflict-affected areas of Sri Lanka.

We trust that Mr. Holmes will reflect these concerns in his reports, on the basis that his ability to obtain an objective assessment of the situation on the ground in the country, based on perspectives of various stakeholders including humanitarian agencies, was negatively affected by this situation.”

Source
Enforced Disappearances and Abductions, Return to War, Human Rights Watch, August 2007; US ‘concerned’ about disappeared, BBC Sinhala, 29 June 2007.

Sources
House of Commons Hansard Debates, Part 9, Daily Hansard, 2 May 2007; House of Commons Hansard Debates, part 14, Daily Hansard, 2 May 2007.

Extracts from Parliamentary debate, Daily Hansard, 2 May 2007
The Minister for the Middle East (Dr. Kim Howells):

“I am pleased to have this opportunity today to debate the current situation in Sri Lanka, and I am grateful to the right hon. and hon. Members present for their interest in this important issue. There has been mounting concern about the continuing violence and tragic displacement of people from their homes on that beautiful island. I want the House to know that this debate is the result of _expressions of concern from right hon. and hon. Members. It is not, as some propagandists and partisan elements have claimed, a debate generated by any faction of Sri Lankan politics or by any lobbying organisations claiming to represent any part of the large Sri Lankan diaspora residing in Britain, pro or anti-LTTE.

“Sadly, those commitments remain unfulfilled. We have over the past year seen worsening violence. Extra-judicial killings, disappearances, intimidation and violence by paramilitary groups are all too common. The violence has fuelled an atmosphere of extreme mistrust and polarisation, which has fuelled further antagonism and violence. Innocent civilians have borne the brunt. There are now more than 100,000 displaced persons in the eastern district of Batticaloa and hundreds more arrive every day. There have been more than 700 cases of missing persons in the Jaffna peninsular, and nearly 500 are still unresolved. There have been more than 50 abductions in Colombo in the past year, and nine media workers have lost their lives in recent months. In the past few weeks, bus bombings have killed dozens of people simply going about their daily business. These are despicable terrorist acts that are totally without justification.

“The responsibility of the LTTE for violent acts over the years is well documented. It is a proscribed organisation under the Terrorism Act 2000. The EU listed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation in May 2006. We have repeatedly urged the LTTE to move away from the path of violence. In the absence of a full renunciation of terrorism in deed and word, there can be no question of reconsidering its proscribed status. LTTE involvement in killings, torture, detention of civilians and denial of freedom of speech is a reality. The LTTE does not tolerate any _expression of opposition and its continuing recruitment of child soldiers is a matter of great concern. …

“The ability of the LTTE to raise funds overseas helps to sustain its ability to carry out violent acts and reduces the incentive to move way from the path of violence. …

“LTTE fundraising activity in the United Kingdom encourages war, not peace. It will not be tolerated, and I have recently met our security authorities to discuss how we can counter the bullying, threats and acts of fraud that are used regularly to extract money from the Tamil population and others in the country. …

“The LTTE is not the only source of violence in Sri Lanka, however. Civilians in Government-controlled areas regularly fall victim to brutal attacks by paramilitary groups, often acting with apparent immunity. Reports of the Government’s links with the faction led by Karuna, a former LTTE commander, concern us a great deal. We believe Karuna and his faction to be responsible for extra-judicial killings, abductions, intimidation of displaced persons and child recruitment. Karuna’s record is appalling, and we will be watching very closely whether he acts on his commitment to the United Nations to address the child recruitment issue. We will want to see clear evidence that he has delivered against his welcome promises. Karuna needs to go further and cease all acts of violence and intimidation against civilians. …

“There must be no question of the Government of Sri Lanka allowing Karuna to perpetrate those crimes. If they are serious in their desire to find paths to an inclusive, peaceful Sri Lanka that embraces all its peoples and cultures, they must disassociate themselves completely from all acts of abuse, terrorism, intimidation or torture, no matter who commits them or what agency encourages them.

Mr. Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Cotswold) (Con):

“Is the Minister aware of the comment made by the FBI assistant director in charge, who said: “Karuna hasn’t merely supported the LTTE cause, he has orchestrated support in the US”? Before the Minister concludes his speech, will he answer two questions? First, what international co-ordination is there on intelligence to stop fundraising for the LTTE? Secondly, is there similar co-ordination to ensure that people such as Karuna, who have committed acts of terrorism, are brought to justice?”

Dr. Howells:

“The hon. Gentleman is right: the list of crimes by this faction is long. We have been exchanging intelligence with a number of agencies in other countries. He will know that I cannot go into detail about that matter, although I can say that lately intelligence has indicated that there may be widespread fraud scams in the country. We are not certain about that, but they may be one of the sources of funding, at least part of which finds its way back to the LTTE and acts of terrorism.”

Peter Luff (Mid-Worcestershire) (Con):

“I intervened on the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) to inquire about the LTTE’s commitment to democracy. Perhaps I did not explain myself clearly. I have severe reservations about whether the LTTE is seriously committed to a democratic process. Its leader is on the record as wanting to establish a one-party independent Tamil state without democratic elections. I see in the LTTE an organisation that is led by a very dangerous individual whose techniques and ruthlessness have caused great concern. Although I share the views expressed by all hon. and right hon. Members in saying that dialogue is important, I question whether the LTTE is an organisation that is capable of holding such dialogue. I hope that I am wrong; I would like to be so. In an intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold, I pointed out that our deputy high commissioner in Sri Lanka will tomorrow be engaging in dialogue with the political wing of the LTTE. I hope that that dialogue is profitable and constructive, but I worry about what we are dealing with in the LTTE. It is a sophisticated and well equipped organisation, uniquely so for a terrorist organisation—and I regard it as a terrorist organisation that can fight on land, on sea and in the air, although it is wrong to describe it as having an air force; I think that there is one light aircraft — I am told that there are five aircraft, but they have significantly enhanced its fighting capabilities.”

Mr. Clifton-Brown:

“We all recognise that India’s involvement in this problem is very sensitive, as well as what happened in the past when it became involved militarily. Nevertheless, as the hon. Member for Ilford, South (Mike Gapes) pointed out, there is a big Tamil population in Tamil Nadu, and there is a suspicion that a lot of support of one kind or another, particularly financial, comes from that state. if we are to try to defeat this terrorist problem, it is important that the international community should include the Indian Government in discussions and intelligence-sharing.”

Peter Luff:

“I am sure that my hon. Friend is right. I sincerely hope that that process is already happening. Fundraising is an important issue for the LTTE. Two Tamil fundraisers were recently prosecuted in Australia, which is causing great controversy in the Tamil community there. The purposes of their fundraising activity must be properly established by due judicial process in Australia. It is unhelpful to see people who are, I am sure, perfectly honourable Tamil nationalists attacking the Australian Government for daring to challenge those people’s fundraising activities. When I think of the recent protests in Paris and Zurich by Tamil communities in France and Switzerland, I worry about the presumption that anyone who dares to attack the LTTE is in some sense attacking the Tamil people. I do not see that connection. Similarly, those who dared to attack Sinn Fein were not attacking the Catholic cause in Northern Ireland. …

“The fact is that violence is always wrong morally, and also politically, because it never produces the outcome that one seeks. When we attack the LTTE for its violence, we are doing so for sound reasons. It is in the Tamil people’s own interests that the LTTE abandon its violence. I entirely agree with the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey that the blame is far from being on one side. I have here the Human Rights Watch report on human rights in Sri Lanka, which graphically details the shortcomings of the LTTE and of the Sri Lankan Government.”

Keith Vaz (Leicester, East) (Lab):

“But if an organisation remains proscribed and isolated, how can it participate in a dialogue that could bring peace to Sri Lanka?”

Peter Luff:

“That is a conundrum. I have to say that I support the Government in allowing the organisation to remain proscribed. It is difficult to see how an organisation that takes part in such abhorrently violent activities—for example, it uses child soldiers as part of its campaign of violence—can be anything other than proscribed. The LTTE has an opportunity to demonstrate a much greater understanding of the challenges that that poses to Governments such as ours. I would welcome it were the Government able to lift that restriction, but I do not see how they can in the current environment. …

“I do not want Sri Lanka to become a political issue in the United Kingdom through the presence of a significant diaspora. That diaspora is here because of the violence. Its members have been driven away from their island and are effectively refugees from that dreadful violence. It is a wonderful community, which does a huge amount for us. Estimates of its size vary between 150,000 and 200,000. Reference has been made to the work its members offer on petrol station forecourts, but they do much more than that. A phenomenally high proportion of the Tamil community—some 2,500—work as doctors in the national health service. They do a great deal for us and we should be grateful to them. …

“I note that the Archbishop of Canterbury is visiting Sri Lanka next week. The Christian community in that country suffers considerable persecution at the hands of the Government. …

“The current edition of the Foreign Office human rights report mentions Sri Lanka’s anti-conversion laws and moves: “to consolidate the position of Buddhism by constitutional amendment and legislation that would control ‘unethical conversion’, in part through criminal sanctions. The bill, which appears to undermine the guarantees of religious freedom enshrined in the Sri Lankan constitution and to be inconsistent with Sri Lanka’s international human rights obligations, is still being debated.”

“Things may have moved on since the report was written. It continues by saying that: “there have been consistent and credible reports of harassment, intimidation, destruction of property and occasional violence against Christians over the last three years… Sri Lankan authorities’ lack of capacity to protect Christians and members of other faiths, and their failure to prosecute those responsible for inciting and committing violent acts” are highlighted. That is an especially worrying example of human rights abuses in Sri Lanka that are firmly at the door of the Sri Lankan Government. For even-handedness, we must understand that there are problems on both sides. We must be careful about imposing—or being seen to or wishing to impose—specific solutions to any internal conflict in a sovereign state from these Benches in the United Kingdom. However, we need to convey a clear message that terror begets only terror, and violence begets violence. That is an iron rule of politics and history. In a world hungry for peace, as we all are now, it is my view that if the LTTE could bring itself to renounce its terrorist activities and take the first brave steps to peace, it would find that respectability would follow remarkably quickly on the heels of such a brave and right decision.

Keith Vaz:

“I want to pay a special tribute to the Minister for the Middle East. This date was originally chosen for a discussion between him and more than 60 MPs who had shown an interest in Sri Lankan issues, particularly in what is happening to the Tamil community. I think that he was surprised at the level of interest and he decided, of his own volition, to put to the Leader of the House the view that there should be a debate today. That has proved to be a much better way of dealing with these matters—having an open debate involving as many MPs as possible on the Floor of the House. I also pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy). In all my discussions with members of the British Tamil community, I have found that they are full of praise for the work that he has done. As we heard today, he has not taken sides on the issues, but has focused the British Government on a particular problem. I am grateful—and I think that we are all grateful—for the fact that he has brought to bear his vast experience of Northern Ireland, which must have been just as complicated as the situation in Sri Lanka. Apart from his day job, which he mentioned, he has allowed himself to go over to Sri Lanka in order to be the eyes and ears of our Prime Minister and to report back on these issues. I hope that we can formalise his role. [Mr Murphy] may not want that, but I think that it would be a good idea if the Government looked to formalise his role so that it was no longer just on an ad hoc basis. He could be given formal envoy status, which would allow him to play the role that we all would like to see this Parliament get involved with.

“On Monday, we established the House’s first ever all-party Tamil group. I was privileged to be elected chair of the group; the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) was elected vice-chair; the hon. Member for Croydon, Central (Mr. Pelling) was elected secretary; the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Susan Kramer) was elected treasurer, as was the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), in his absence in Scotland. That shows that it really is an all-party group, because all parties are represented in this cause.

“The group was determined not to be just like any other all-party group. We were determined to take the issue forward, and on that basis we agreed three things. First, at the end of September a delegation of all party members should visit Sri Lanka, particularly areas under the control of the Tamil Tigers, to engage in a dialogue in a positive and constructive way. We also agreed to invite the chief negotiator for the Tamil Tigers to visit the United Kingdom and to come to Parliament so that we could hear his views on what is happening.

“The third thing that we agreed was to hold a summit meeting here in July at which all the various parties could participate as a means of exploring how to take the issue forward. Although we have not had a debate of this kind in the House before, listening to the experience of so many right hon. Members and hon. Members reminds me that we have had many such discussions outside Parliament. It really is time to make progress, rather than simply discussing these issues from time to time as we do now.

“My hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Mr. Khan) pointed out that we are also concerned with the Tamil community here, and that that is what drives us. Many of us are interested in foreign affairs, but what drives us as constituency MPs is our constituents coming to see us in our surgeries, at public meetings and at various projects in our constituencies to point out the contribution that the British Tamil community has made. When my hon. Friend mentioned the Tooting Tamils, I thought that that made them sound so British that they could be a local football club. They are as British as you and I, Madam Deputy Speaker, and they make a full contribution to this country. They contribute to the economy and to the national health service, as the hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire pointed out. Almost 2,500 Tamils work in the NHS, not just as GPs and other doctors; one of the leading pre-natal surgeons is based in a hospital in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Tooting.

“The British Tamils have become first-class contributors, and they therefore deserve to have us debate these issues in the House. For the reasons mentioned earlier by the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey, they are constantly aware of what is happening to their friends and relatives in Sri Lanka. That is why they deserve to hear these issues discussed, and to have them taken forward, rather than just discussed in the usual parliamentary way.
“I was present at a very useful meeting that the British Tamil Forum had with our Home Secretary, who reminded us of the phrase—I cannot remember who said it originally, but I am sure that someone here will know—“One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. I am sure that it was not the Home Secretary’s phrase; he was merely reminding us of it. This was in the context of a discussion on how to lift the ban. I firmly believe that the ban on the Tamil Tigers—certainly as regards the way in which they operate in this country—should be lifted as soon as possible.

“The proscription by the Government of various organisations in 2001 happened because of certain events that were occurring worldwide at the time, and we reacted by imposing that ban on a number of organisations, including a Sikh organisation that operated from my constituency. I know that Governments sometimes have to react in a knee-jerk manner, but six years have now passed and it is time to reconsider the ban and to look at ways in which we can help to ensure that the dialogue proceeds.”

Related events
May 2007
19 April 2007

Extracts from UN News Centre report

"The 20-page report covers the period from 1 November 2005 to 31 October 2006, and notes that over these 12 months, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) received reports of hundreds of children being recruited by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and also Sri Lankan army involvement in recruitment of children by the Karuna faction.

“Despite previous commitments by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, that group continues to use and recruit children. In addition, a particularly disconcerting development during the reporting period was the increase in abductions and recruitment of children in the east by the Karuna faction, a breakaway group of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” it states.

“Reports have also been received in Batticaloa District that on 14 and 26 June, Sri Lankan Army personnel carrying weapons, accompanied Karuna faction members who forcibly abducted and recruited nine children aged 14 (two children), 15 (one child) and 17 years (six children),” the document adds, referring to the eastern part of the island.

"In outlining his recommendations, the Secretary-General reiterates his call for an immediate end to the conflict, which has already caused the deaths of more than 65,000 people in over 20 years, while stressing that any peace settlement must include provisions that “ensure the protection of children.

“Although limited progress has been made in the release of some children from LTTE over the last three years, the refusal of LTTE to completely cease recruitment and use of children, release all children remaining on the UNICEF database and engage in transparent procedures for release and verification of demobilization warrants the undertaking of targeted measures against LTTE political and military leadership.

"He also calls for the Government to investigate immediately allegations that certain elements of the Sri Lanka security forces are involved in aiding the recruitment and/or abduction of children by the Karuna faction in the East, and invites UNICEF and other relevant agencies to help address the matter."

Sources
Sri Lanka youth ‘seized to fight’, BBC, 13 November 2006; Karuna Group abducts children for combat, Human Rights Watch, 24 January 2007.

Extracts from Report of Allan Rock, Special Adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict on Sri Lanka

“As documented in the Secretary-General’s Report, the LTTE has been actively recruiting and abducting children in the northern and eastern districts of Sri Lanka for years. Despite having been repeatedly named by the Secretary-General in his annual reports to the Security Council on child recruitment, and despite LTTE’s own repeated promises that it would stop child recruitment and release the children in its ranks, UNICEF has verified, and the Secretary-General has reported, LTTE’s continued pattern of abduction, recruitment and use of children.

“The Karuna faction abducts and recruits children into its forces. It does so exclusively in the eastern districts of Sri Lanka. The Secretary-General’s Report disclosed that from November 2005 to October 2006, there were 164 reports of children having been abducted by the Karuna faction, 142 of whom still remain in its ranks. Since May 2006, the number of abductions has increased sharply. In the space of one week in mid-June 2006 alone, UNICEF received 30 reports alleging that children had been abducted by the Karuna faction in the areas of Santhiveli, Kiran, Mankerni, Valachchenai and Iruthayapuram (Manmunai North) of Batticaloa district.

“The fact that the Karuna faction has abducted so many children in Government-controlled areas in the eastern districts of Sri Lanka raises the question why the Government has not more effectively protected those children, investigated the complaints made by the children’s families, and secured the release and return of the children from the Karuna faction camps that are located in areas under Government control.

“Based on the facts and circumstances set out in this report, I have concluded that certain elements of the Sri Lankan security forces are complicit in the abduction of children by the Karuna faction, and that at least some elements of the security forces have facilitated and sometimes participated in those abductions.

“The complicity of certain elements of the security forces in Karuna faction abductions is common knowledge in the eastern areas where I traveled. The civilian population is in no doubt about why Karuna faction members (as described more fully below) work openly with Government security forces at checkpoints, carry weapons on the streets with impunity, and escape investigation despite many complaints to police and security forces about their involvement in child abductions.”

Eight national Commissioners were formally announced and mandated to obtain information, investigate and inquire into alleged serious violations of human rights arising since the 1st of August, 2005, that also included 16 specific cases and the examination of prior investigations into these cases.

The President had initially intimated (on 4 September 2006) that there would be an international, independent Commission to probe alleged abductions, disappearances and extra judicial killings. On 6 September, the President instead called for an International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) to act as observers of investigations conducted by a Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Serious Human Rights Violations. The IIGEP was also expected to comment on the Commission’s compliance with international norms and standards and propose correctional action.

Sources
UN rights chief hails [probe into extrajudicial killings but voices concerns, UN News Centre, 7 November 2007; Amnesty International urges effective action to end impunity, Amnesty International, 1 December 2006. Strengthen national institutions to deal with human rights violations and overcome national regression, Media statement, National Peace Council, 3 July 2007.

Quotations

"It will be critically important for the Commission to establish not only individual responsibility for crimes, but the broader patterns and context in which they occur.” High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour.

"Amnesty International recognises that the human rights situation in Sri Lanka has been characterized by decades of impunity for perpetrators of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. In this regard, the creation of a Commission of Inquiry could be a timely and potentially valuable undertaking. However, the organisation is concerned that the Government of Sri Lanka has cut too many corners in establishing its currentnational Commission of Inquiry and the accompanying International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP)." Amnesty International, 1 December 2006.

The 16 cases
Case No. 1: Assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar, Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka.
Case No. 2: Killing of 17 aid workers of the international non-governmental organisation Action Contra La Faim in early August 2006.
Case No. 3: Alleged execution of Muslim villagers in Muttur in early August 2006 and the execution at Welikanda of 14 persons from Muttur who were being transported in ambulances.
Case No. 4: Assassination of Joseph Pararajasingham, Member of Parliament on 25 December 2005.
Case No. 5: Killing of 5 youths in Trincomalee on or about 2 January 2006.
Case No. 6: Assassination of Ketheesh Loganathan, Deputy Director General of the Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat (SCOPP) on 12 August 2006.
Case No. 7: Death of 51 persons in Naddalamottankulam (Sencholai) in August 2006.
Case No. 8: Disappearance of Rev. Nihal Jim Brown of Philip Neri's Church at Allaipidi on 28 August 2006.
Case No. 9: Killing of 5 fishermen and another at Pesalai beach and at the Pesalai Church on 17 June 2006.
Case No. 10: Killing of thirteen 13 persons in Kayts police area on 13 May 2006.
Case No. 11: Killing of 10 Muslim villagers at Radella in Pottuvil police area on 17 September 2006.
Case No. 12: Killing of 68 persons at Kebithigollewa on 15 June 2006.
Case No. 13: Incident relating to the finding of 5 headless bodies in Avissawella on 29 April 2006.
Case No. 14: Killing of 13 persons at Welikanda on 29 May 2005.
Case No. 15: Killing of 98 security forces personnel in Digampathana, Sigiriya, on 16 October 2006.
Case No. 16: Assassination of Nadarajah Raviraj, Member of Parliament on 10 November 2006.

Related events
4 August 2006
11 June 2007
25 June 2007
6 March 2008

Sources
Ceasefire signed in Sri Lanka, BBC, 22 February 2002; Text of Sri Lanka truce deal, BBC, 22 February 2002

Quotations

“It feels very good and so many people have worked so hard for so long but the hardest part is ahead. … This is a basis for future efforts. You can’t sit and negotiate when people are shooting at each other.” Erik Solheim, Norway’s peace envoy.

“I have a strong belief that we will have peace, but I have no illusion that it will be easy.” Ranil Wickramasinghe, Sri Lankan Prime Minister.

“A favourable feature [of the current peace process] is the mediation of a third party. Besides, Ranil Wickremasinghe has taken some bold decisions. I am satisfied with the peace talks. … I believe that these will bring success to some extent to the peace efforts.” Velupillai Prabhakaran quoted in Front Line Magazine, Volume 19 – Issue 09, Apr. 27 – May 10, 2002.

“We have told the Government and we have informed the Norwegians that de-proscription is a necessary condition for the commencement of the talks…. We want to be de-proscribed properly. The provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act should be amended properly so that we can be de-proscribed and accepted as the authentic representative of the Tamil people and so that we will participate in the peace process as representatives of our people with equal status [to that of the Sri Lankan government representatives]. That has been our official position.” Anton Balasingam quoted in Front Line Magazine, Volume 19 – Issue 09, Apr. 27 – May 10, 2002.

“The president expressed surprise and concern that she was being informed, for the first time, of the contents of the agreement after it was signed by Mr V Prabhakaran and just a few hours before the prime minister proposed to put his signature to it.” Statement from the office of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, 2002.

Opinion
Interview with Austin Fernando, a Peacetime Secretary of Defence in Sri Lanka, Groundviews, 2 November 2008.

Text of Ceasefire Agreement
Preamble
The overall objective of the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (hereinafter referred to as the LTTE) is to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.

The GOSL and the LTTE (hereinafter referred to as the parties) recognise the importance of bringing an end to the hostilities and improving the living conditions for all inhabitants affected by the conflict.

Bringing an end to the hostilities is also seen by the parties as a means of establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can be taken.

The parties further recognise that groups that are not directly party to the conflict are also suffering the consequences of it.

This is particularly the case as regards the Muslim population. Therefore, the provisions of this agreement regarding the security of civilians and their property apply to all inhabitants.

With reference to the above, the parties have agreed to enter into a ceasefire, refrain from conduct that could undermine the good intentions or violate the spirit of this agreement and implement confidence-building measures as indicated in the articles below.

Article 1: Modalities of a ceasefire

The parties have agreed to implement a ceasefire between their armed forces as follows:

1.1 A jointly agreed ceasefire between the GOSL and the LTTE shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in accordance with Article 4.2, hereinafter referred to as D-day.

Military operations

1.2 Neither party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to, such acts as:

a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units;
b) Aerial bombardment;
c) Offensive naval operations.

1.3 The Sri Lankan armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE.

Separation of forces

1.4 Where forward defence localities have been established, the GOSL’s armed forces and the LTTE’s fighting formations shall hold their ground positions, maintaining a zone of separation of a minimum of 600 metres.

However, each party reserves the right of movement within 100 metres of its own defence localities, keeping an absolute minimum distance of 400 metres between them.

Where existing positions are closer than 400 metres, no such right of movement applies and the parties agree to ensure the maximum possible distance between their personnel.

1.5 In areas where localities have not been clearly established, the status quo as regards the areas controlled by the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively, on 24 December 2001 shall continue to apply pending such demarcation as is provided in article 1.6.

1.6 The parties shall provide information to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) regarding defence localities in all areas of contention, cf. Article 3. The monitoring mission shall assist the parties in drawing up demarcation lines at the latest by D-day + 30.

1.7 The parties shall not move munitions, explosives or military equipment into the area controlled by the other party.

1.8 Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day + 30 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.

Freedom of movement

1.9 The parties’ forces shall initially stay in the areas under their respective control, as provided in Article 1.4 and Article 1.5.

1.10 Unarmed GOSL troops shall, as of D-day + 60, be permitted unlimited passage between Jaffna and Vavunyia using the Jaffna-Kandy road (A9). The modalities are to be worked out by the parties with the assistance of the SLMM.

1.11 The parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall, on the recommendation of their area commander, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit family and friends residing in areas under the control of the other party. Such visits shall be limited to six days every second month, not including the time of travel by the shortest applicable route. The LTTE shall facilitate the use of the Jaffna-Kandy road for this purpose. The parties reserve the right to deny entry to specified military areas.

1.12 The parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall notwithstanding the two-month restriction, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit immediate family (ie spouses, children, grandparents, parents and siblings) in connection with weddings or funerals. The right to deny entry to specified military areas applies.

1.13 Fifty unarmed LTTE members shall as of D-day + 30, for the purpose of political work, be permitted freedom of movement in the areas of the North and the East dominated by the GOSL. Additional 100 unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement as of D-day + 60. As of D-day + 90, all unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement in the North and the East. The LTTE members shall carry identity papers. The right of the GOSL to deny entry to specified military areas applies.

Article 2: Measures to restore normalcy

The parties shall undertake the following confidence-building measures with the aim of restoring normalcy for all inhabitants of Sri Lanka:

2.1 The parties shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population, including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment.

2.2 The parties shall refrain from engaging in activities or propagating ideas that could offend cultural or religious sensitivities. Places of worship (temples, churches, mosques and other holy sites etc.) currently held by the forces of either of the parties shall be vacated by D-day + 30 and made accessible to the public. Places of worship which are situated in “high security zones” shall be vacated by all armed personnel and maintained in good order by civilian workers, even when they are not made accessible to the public.

2.3 Beginning on the date on which this agreement enters into force, school buildings occupied by either party shall be vacated and returned to their intended use. This activity shall be completed by D-day + 160 at the latest.

2.4 A schedule indicating the return of all other public buildings to their intended use shall be drawn up by the parties and published at the latest by D-day + 30.

2.5 The parties shall review the security measures and the set-up of checkpoints, particularly in densely populated cities and towns, in order to introduce systems that will prevent harassment of the civilian population. Such systems shall be in place from D-day + 60.

2.6 The parties agree to ensure the unimpeded flow of non-military goods to and from the LTTE-dominated areas with the exception of certain items as shown in Annex A. Quantities shall be determined by market demand. The GOSL shall regularly review the matter with the aim of gradually removing any remaining restrictions on non-military goods.

2.7 In order to facilitate the flow of goods and the movement of civilians, the parties agree to establish checkpoints on their line of control at such locations as are specified in Annex B.

2.8 The parties shall take steps to ensure that the Trincomalee-Habarana road remains open on a 24-hour basis for passenger traffic with effect from D-day + 10.

2.9 The parties shall facilitate the extension of the rail service on the Batticaloa-line to Welikanda. Repairs and maintenance shall be carried out by the GOSL in order to extend the service up to Batticaloa.

2.10 The parties shall open the Kandy-Jaffna road (A9) to non-military traffic of goods and passengers. Specific modalities shall be worked out by the parties with the assistance of the Royal Norwegian Government by D-day + 30 at the latest.

2.11 A gradual easing of the fishing restrictions shall take place starting from D-day. As of D-day + 90, all restrictions on day and night fishing shall be removed, subject to the following exceptions: (i) fishing will not be permitted within an area of 1 nautical mile on either side along the coast and 2 nautical miles seawards from all security forces camps on the coast; (ii) fishing will not be permitted in harbours or approaches to harbours, bays and estuaries along the coast.

2.12 The parties agree that search operations and arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act shall not take place. Arrests shall be conducted under due process of law in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code.

2.13 The parties agree to provide family members of detainees access to the detainees within D-day + 30.

Article 3: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

The parties have agreed to set up an international monitoring mission to enquire into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions of this agreement. Both parties shall fully cooperate to rectify any matter of conflict caused by their respective sides. The mission shall conduct international verification through on-site monitoring of the fulfilment of the commitments entered into in this agreement as follows:

3.1 The name of the monitoring mission shall be the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (hereinafter referred to as the SLMM).

3.2 Subject to acceptance by the parties, the Royal Norwegian Government (hereinafter referred to as the RNG) shall appoint the Head of the SLMM (hereinafter referred to as the HoM), who shall be the final authority regarding interpretation of this agreement.

3.3 The SLMM shall liaise with the parties and report to the RNG.

3.4 The HoM shall decide the date for the commencement of the SLMM’s operations.

3.5 The SLMM shall be composed of representatives from Nordic countries.

3.6 The SLMM shall establish a headquarters in such place as the HoM finds appropriate. An office shall be established in Colombo and in Vanni in order to liaise with the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively. The SLMM will maintain a presence in the districts of Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai.

3.7 A local monitoring committee shall be established in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai. Each committee shall consist of five members, two appointed by the GOSL, two by the LTTE and one international monitor appointed by the HoM. The international monitor shall chair the committee. The GOSL and the LTTE appointees may be selected from among retired judges, public servants, religious leaders or similar leading citizens.

3.8 The committees shall serve the SLMM in an advisory capacity and discuss issues relating to the implementation of this agreement in their respective districts, with a view to establishing a common understanding of such issues. In particular, they will seek to resolve any dispute concerning the implementation of this agreement at the lowest possible level.

3.9 The parties shall be responsible for the appropriate protection of and security arrangements for all SLMM members.

3.10 The parties agree to ensure the freedom of movement of the SLMM members in performing their tasks. The members of the SLMM shall be given immediate access to areas where violations of the agreement are alleged to have taken place. The parties also agree to facilitate the widest possible access to such areas for the local members of the six above-mentioned committees, cf. Article 3.7.

3.11 It shall be the responsibility of the SLMM to take immediate action on any complaints made by either Party to the agreement, and to enquire into and assist the parties in the settlement of any dispute that might arise in connection with such complaints.

3.12 With the aim of resolving disputes at the lowest possible level, communication shall be established between commanders of the GOSL armed forces and the LTTE area leaders to enable them to resolve problems in the conflict zones.

3.13 Guidelines for the operations of the SLMM shall be established in a separate document.

Article 4: Entry into force, amendments and termination of the agreement

4.1 Each party shall notify its consent to be bound by this agreement through a letter to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs signed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe on behalf of the GOSL and by leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on behalf of the LTTE respectively. The agreement shall be initialled by each party and enclosed in the above-mentioned letter.

4.2 The agreement shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

4.3 This agreement may be amended and modified by mutual agreement of both parties. Such amendments shall be notified in writing to the RNG.

4.4 This agreement shall remain in force until notice of termination is given by either party to the RNG. Such notice shall be given 14 days in advance of the effective date of termination.

Annexes
Annex A: List of goods
Annex B: Checkpoints
Source: Full text of the ceasefire agreement, The Guardian, 22 February 2002.

Related events
GoSL closes the A9 highway
SLMM reports death toll figures
Suspected LTTE bomb attack in Buttala

Source

Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1999; Gaps in the Krishanthy Kumarasamy Case: Disappearances & Accountability, UTHR,  28 April 1999;

Quotation

“Like many Tamil civilians ‘disappeared’ in security force operations, Krishanthy was abducted from a military checkpoint; her family members and neighbor who attempted to find her were taken from the same checkpoint later that day.” Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1999.

Source
Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1998.

Source
Human Rights Watch World Report: Sri Lanka, 1998.

Quotations

“On February 11, one day before the deadline for filing nominations in the March 21 local elections, People’s Alliance (PA) Member of Parliament (MP) Nalanda Ellawalla was assassinated…The murder sparked a rampage in southern Sri Lanka, as PA supporters burned scores of UNP homes and buildings. A special police unit set up to monitor campaign and election violence recorded 369 complaints in February alone, including many incidents of threats and assaults on UNP and other opposition party members by PA supporters. In an effort to contain the violence, President Kumaratunga ordered the confiscation of arms owned by political party members and declared an amnesty until March 15 for those who voluntarily turned in their weapons. Some took advantage of the amnesty, but many did not. Two citizens’ groups monitoring the vote, the Movement for Free and Fair Elections and the Movement against Political Violence, reported 1,836 incidents of political violence during the elections, including murder, assault, voter intimidation and impersonation, theft of polling cards, and abduction and intimidation of opposition polling agents. The government was accused of using state-owned media to influence the election, and international observers were denied visas.” Extract from Human Rights Watch report, 1998.

“He was a young MP who was active in working for PA-UNP consensus on a political solution to the ethnic solution. What he represented was a willingness and ability of backbench parliamentarians to approach the ethnic conflict in a genuinely non-partisan manner.” PA-UNP Cooperation is essential, Press release, National Peace Council, 13 February 1997.

At the time of his abduction, de Zoysa was the head of the Colombo office of the International Press Service. On 18 February 1990, an armed group broke into his mother’s house, and forcibly removed de Zoysa. The next day, de Zoysa’s body was found in the sea at Moratuwa, some 12 miles south of Colombo. He had been shot in the head and the throat, and his jaw had been broken. His body was identified by his journalist friend Taraki Sivaram, who was assassinated in 2006.

In 2005, two police officers were indicted for de Zoysa’s murder, but all were acquitted on 9 November 2005 by the Colombo High Court, ruling that the evidence presented by the prosecution was “contradictory and not credible”.

Richard de Zoysa was posthumously awarded the International Press Service Award in 1990. This award was established in 1985 to honour outstanding accomplishments in international journalism, promoting democracy and human rights.

Sources
‘Assassinated Journalists’, Free Media Sri Lanka; Insurrectionary Violence in Sri Lanka: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Insurgencies of 1971 and 1987-1989, Tisaranee Gunasekara, Ethnic Studies Report, ICES, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1999;

Quotations

“In A Lost Generation, Prins Gunasekara has a very interesting story to tell—that when he met de Zoysa’s mother, Dr Manorani Saravanamuttu, she did not believe that Premadasa had anything to do with her son’s murder. On the contrary she had believed that it “was the handywork of some jealous persons in the Premadasa administration, like Ranjan Wijeratne, acting independently of President Premadasa. It may even be some old school feud carried too far. At least that is what Manorani Saravanamuttu told me… I told her it was alright telling me about her disbelief in Premadasa’s involvement but she should not voice such naïve statements elsewhere, as her own credibility would be doubted,” Insurrectionary Violence in Sri Lanka: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Insurgencies of 1971 and 1987-1989, Tisaranee Gunasekara.

“Had he lived, Richard de Zoysa would have been fifty on March 13th this year. He died eighteen years ago, almost the last victim of a period of abductions and killings about which there were hardly any protests at the time, except from a relatively small group of political activists opposed to the government. … The government of the time was after all the chosen instrument of the elite, that still makes decisions, that still constitutes the lens through which much of the West looks at us, and they had had no great problem with President Premadasa’s suppression of the JVP. … But Richard was himself a member of that elite, the scion of two long established families, one Sinhala, the other Tamil. Even though there were crude attempts to justify the killing – leaks about him belonging to the JVP, readings in Parliament from his diary in an attempt to suggest that his sexual proclivities had something to do with the death – in the end it was crystal clear that the government had gone too far. Certainly, it was almost immediately after his death that, his mother would say, Ranjan Wijeratne called the death squads together and told them, at a party at the BMICH she claimed, that their impunity was now over, they would have immunity for anything they had thus far done, but for the future they were on their own. My own view, which I have expressed elsewhere, and most recently in ‘The Limits of Love’, albeit fictionally, is that President Premadasa took advantage of the murder to call a halt to the killings that he had begun to feel were unnecessary now. In that sense, Richard’s murder was not in vain,” Dr. Rajiva Wijesinha, Daily Mirror, 13 March 2008.

Related events
13 November 1989
21 September 1989
August 1987

This event was the subject of a feature: Assassination of an activist.

On 10 November 2006, Nadarajah Raviraj, human rights activist and parliamentarian, was assassinated in Colombo. Two years on, PACT looks at his life and work and also other notable Sri Lankan activists killed for speaking out.

We invite you to contribute your views and ask, is activism dead in Sri Lanka?

Nadarajah Raviraj (1962-2006)

“I go for TV interviews with my broken Sinhala not to gain political mileage – none of the Tamils watch those – but to build an understanding with the Sinhalese people and to tell them about the plight of the Tamils,” Nadarajah Raviraj.

Kethesh Loganathan (1952-2006)

“At the time of his death ‘Ketheesh’ was Deputy Secretary-General of the Peace Secretariat and Secretary of the APRC. This makes him appear as a pro-government “establishment” man. The eulogies heaped on him by the “government guys” reinforce this impression. This is perhaps the unkindest cut of all,” D.B.S. Jeyaraj.

Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam (1944-1999)

“Tiruchelvam had sharp and firm convictions. His commitment to reconciliation and to radical, but peaceful change set him at odds with those whose positions were more entrenched.” Excerpt from The Times obituary.

Richard de Zoysa (1958-1990)

“Even though there were crude attempts to justify the killing – leaks about him belonging to the JVP, readings in Parliament from his diary in an attempt to suggest that his sexual proclivities had something to do with the death – in the end it was crystal clear that the government had gone too far,” Rajiva Wijesinha.

Dr. Rajani Thiranagama (1954-1989)

“One day some gun will silence me and it will not be held by an outsider, but by the son born in the womb of this very society, from a woman with whom my history is shared,” Rajani Thiranagama.

Vijaya Kumaratunga (1945-1988)

“In 1986, at the height of the ethnic conflict 6 policemen were taken hostage by the LTTE. It was Vijaya Kumaratunga who went to Jaffna to intervene and secure their release,” Kumar Rupesinghe.

Activists suggested by PACT users:

K. Kanthasamy (1930-1988)

“If we cannot carry on as a free organisation we should close it down,” K. Kanthasamy writing about the relief and rehabilitation organisation in which he worked, shortly before his abduction and disappearance in 1988. Kanthasamy also helped set up the Jaffna-based Saturday Review to (in his
own words) “lend its voice against any human rights violations in the country”.

Audio commentary

Traitors, martyrs or patriots?
Interview series with academic and activist, Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe.

Part 1: Kethesh Loganathan [Audio clip: view full post to listen]
Part 2: Neelan Tiruchelvam [Audio clip: view full post to listen]
Part 3: Nadarajah Raviraj and Vijaya Kumaratunga [Audio clip: view full post to listen]

Other features
Feature: Historical roots of conflict in Sri Lanka
Feature: 18th anniversary of expulsion of northern Muslims by LTTE
Feature: “Black July”, 1983